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Abstract 
This dissertation, is written as part of the LLM in “Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Arbitration, Mediation and Energy Law” at the International Hellenic 
University. The EU state aid rules are again under the word’s spotlight after the 
Commission’s largest-ever adverse state aid decision against Apple. In the last two 
years, much attention has been focused on the need of the modernization process of 
EU state aid law with practitioners highlighting the need for the revitalization of the 
enforcement of state aid rules, especially using private enforcement and judicial 
enforcement. In that context, the role of national court in the Enforcement of 
European state aid rules seems to be even more important as an active mover in the 
shaping and enhancement of the notion of state aid. How can national courts better 
fulfill their obligation to safeguard the rights of individuals under Article 108(3) TFEU? 
How much use can national courts be in dealing with State aids?  
 
This paper explores the powers and duties of national courts when they enforce EU 
state aid law, particularly when, they deal with the assessment of whether a national 
measure constitutes illegal state aid. The main argument is that the role of national 
judges in the state aid field is growing in terms of practical importance. While the first 
principles that set the basis for the competences of judges in the Member States’ 
courts are unchanged, the environment in which those principles come into effect has 
shifted. Acknowledging this increasing trend in national court’s role, the paper 
concludes with some recommendations on what European Commission could do to 
encourage the national courts to take up as fully as they could their role as enforcers 
of the rights and obligations arising from Article 108(3) TFEU and their duties in the 
broader recovery context. 
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Introduction 
State aid is one of the sectors in which the EU legal order seeks to find a 
balance between the role of the European Commission and the role of national courts. 
Identifying this balance tends to be quite challenging for the EU, considering the 
increasing role of national courts in the enforcement of state aid rules. More 
importantly, over the years, state aid control provisions, have evolved, stemming from 
the Treaty, secondary legislation, as well as case law. The result of this regulatory and 
jurisprudential stratification is the increasing complexity of state aid law, rendering, 
thus, the need for effective enforcement more important than ever.1 
 
The European Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed that both the European 
Commission and national courts play essential, but distinct, roles in the context of 
state aid enforcement.2 The first one, according to Article 108 (1) and (2) TFEU, as 
interpreted by Community courts jurisprudence, has the exclusive authority in the 
assessment of the compatibility of the aid. As for the latter, neither the Treaty nor 
Regulation 659/1999, expressly mentioned Member State’s national judge, until the 
amendment introduced by Regulation 734/2013 of July 2013.3 Nevertheless, the ECJ 
identified the role of national courts in the enforcement of state quite early. However, 
in the light of the recent EU case law, many practitioners have expressed concerns 
with regards to it. 
 
This paper aims to elucidate the role of national courts in the enforcement of the 
European State aid rules in the light of the recent EU case law with a particular focus 
on the standstill obligation, as laid out in Article 108(3) TFEU. Acknowledging the 
increasing role of Member State’s national judge, the main argument of this paper is 
                                               
1Herwig C. H. Hofmann and Claire Micheau, eds., State Aid Law of the European Union (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016)., Foreword  
2 Joanna Goyder and Margot Dons, “ARTICLES - STATE AID AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS · Damages 
Claims Based on State Aid Law Infringements,” European State Aid Law Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2017): 418–
30, https://doi.org/10.21552/estal/2017/3/10. 
3See Article 23(a) entitled “Cooperation with national courts”, “EU Competition and State Aid Rules - 
Public and Private Enforcement | Vesna Tomljenović | Springer,” accessed August 16, 2018, 
https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783662479612.p.222 
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that its role is closely linked, on the one hand, to the direct effect of the standstill 
clause, on the other hand, to the activity of the Commission. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis will start by providing in Chapter I a general overview of the 
legal framework covering “state aid.” Beginning with the definition of “state aid” and 
the analysis of the main elements consisting its notion, it further proceeds with the 
analysis of the conditions on the compatibility in the various sub-categories created by 
the Community law. Thus, de jure compatible aid under Article 107(2) and aid subject 
to a discretionary assessment according to Article 107(3) are addressed. The following 
step will entail the analysis of the procedural rules focusing on the notification 
obligation and standstill obligation, which seems to set the basis for the intervention of 
national courts in the enforcement of European state aid rules. 
 
 Similar, for a successful report on their role, it is necessary to put it in its context. An 
additional purpose of this thesis is therefore to clarify the administrative procedure 
and the privileged dialogue between the European Commission and the Member State 
concerned. In doing so, Chapter II does not solely provide a commentary on the 
administrative procedures in relation to state aid investigation, but also examines their 
main gap, the limitations on the rights of interested parties, leaving thus space for the 
intervention of national courts. 
 
Further on, Chapter III will be dedicated to the role of national courts as “full partners 
in the enforcement of the state aid discipline”4. In particular, a detailed analysis of the 
remedies that national courts may adopt in order to offset the negative consequences 
of the unlawful state aid will be provided with a particular focus on the assessment of 
the 2009 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid by national courts. This 
thesis concludes with the recommendations on what more the Commission and 
national courts can do to render the enforcement of state aid law a robust force in 
national litigation.  
 
                                               
4 Leo Flynn, “Taking Flight, Not Taking Fright: The National Court as a Full Partner in the Enforcement of 
the State Aid Discipline,” European State Aid Law Quarterly (ESTAL) 2017 (2017): 335. 
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As far as the methodological aspects of the research are concerned, a theoretical 
approach is adopted, involving a comparison and contrast of a wide variety of sources, 
including the examination of the relevant literature, the study of the relevant 
legislative sources, and the approaches already established by the Court of Justice 
case-law. What needs to be emphasized is that the literature on state aid in the 
national courts is rarely written by academics but is commented on by practitioners, 
judges, European Commission officials etc. 
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CHAPTER I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter aims to provide a general overview of the legal framework covering “state 
aid.” Acknowledging the complexity of the European state aid law, the first section 
deals with the notion of state aid, with a particular focus on the four elements. It 
examines the criterion of state origin the notion of undertaking, the criterion of 
advantage and selectivity, the distortion of competition and the effect on trade 
between EU Member States. 
1.1 Definition of “State Aid” 
When dealing with competition law and state aid, the fundamental rules can be found 
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.5 While the Treaty itself does 
not provide a concrete definition of state aid given the complexity of its nature, Article 
107 TFEU lays out four criteria which must all be met in order for a measure to be 
considered as state aid.6 More precisely, according to Article 107 TFEU: 
 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
 
As provided by this article, to be classified as state aid a measure needs to (1) contain 
some kind of intervention from a state or through state resources,7 (2) confer the 
                                               
5 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union - Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - 
Protocols - Annexes - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which 
adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT 
6 “The concept of an aid is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, 
such as subsidies them self, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which 
are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being subsidies in 
the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect”. 
7 See i.e. C-379/98 Preussen Elektra v Schleswag, EU:C:2001:160, para 58; C-345/02 
Pearle, EU:C:2004:448, para 35; and C-303/88 Italy v Commission EU:C:1991:136, para 11. 
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recipient a benefit or an advantage on a selective basis (3) threaten or distort the 
competition (4) have an impact on the inter-state trade. These four criteria are 
cumulative meaning that all must be fulfilled before the Member State measure falls 
within the scope of Article 107 TFEU. In order to get a better understanding of the 
“state aid” concept, the following sections briefly describe the aforementioned 
conditions. 
1.1.1 Granted by a Member State or through state resources 
The first condition requests that there has been an intervention by the state or 
through state resources which can take a variety of forms (e.g. grants, interest and tax 
reliefs, guarantees, government holdings of all or part of a company, or providing 
goods and services on preferential terms, etc.)8 Defining whether a measure emanates 
from the state or not, is essential for the regulation of Article 107 TFEU. The European 
Court of Justice ( hereinafter referred to as the ECJ) has interpreted this criterion quite 
broadly including beneficial treatment not only from the central governance but also 
from regional or local government bodies.9 Indeed, what is crucial in Court’s view is 
whether the decision to grant aid can be attributed to the state, the so called 
“imputability criterion”. The imputability criterion was established in the Stardust 
Marine case10, which involved aid to a boat company given by a publicly owned bank.11 
The Commission considered the aid to be granted through state resources, because 
the Bank was controlled by the state. However, the Court followed a different 
approach introducing the imputability criterion and concluded that there was no state 
aid involved, because the aid could not be attributed either directly or indirectly to the 
state, simply by taking into account the legal personality of the public undertaking. 
1.1.2 A benefit or an advantage on a selective basis 
After acknowledging the origin of the aid, one has to consider whether the measure 
confers a benefit or an advantage on the recipient. In doing so, the Court has 
                                               
8“What Is State Aid? European Commission,” accessed April 5, 2018, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html. 
9 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra  v Schleswag, EU:C:2001:160, para 58 
10 Case C-482/99. French Republic v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294 
11Andréas Vidmar, “Selectivity in European State Aid? – A Comprehensive Review of the Selectivity 
Criterion Applied to Tax Measures,” 2017, http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8908759. 
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introduced a test, the “Market Economy Investor Principle”, whose aim is to safeguard 
effective competition within the internal market. The idea behind the MEIP is that 
“when a public authority invests in an enterprise on terms and in conditions which 
would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy 
conditions, the investment is not a state aid.”12 This test – though not mentioned 
directly in the Treaty-has been used extensively by the Court while interpreting what 
the Treaty means by “favouring” in Article 107(1).13  
However, not all granted economic benefits constitute state aid unless they display a 
degree of selectivity. This selective advantage can be granted to an individual 
undertaking, to a group of undertakings or to undertakings operating in certain 
economic sectors.14 Hence, subsidies granted to individuals or general measures open 
to all enterprises without distinction can therefore not constitute State aid. As with the 
definition for state aid, again, there is no definition for either a selective or a general 
measure. The most common example of the latter is general taxation measures or 
employment legislation. 
1.1.3 Distortion of competition  
The distortion of competition criterion is met if a measure is liable to improve the 
beneficiary’s position compared to other undertakings with which it competes. In 
other words, the Community courts will consider the company’s position before and 
after the measure in order to assess whether the aid has improved the situation for 
the undertaking in relation to its competitors.15 In that context, it is crucial that the 
market is structured in a way that competition can be distorted. 16 For example, in the 
                                               
12Ben SLOCOCK and Directorate-General Competition, “The Market Economy Investor Principle,” no. 2 
(2002): 4. 
13 Adina Claici, Georges Siotis, Obhi Chatterjee, Oliver Stehmann; THE MARKET ECONOMY INVESTOR 
PRINCIPLE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CIUDAD DE LA LUZ CASE, Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics, Volume 12, Issue 1, 1 March 2016, Pages 181–208, https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhv040 
14 An undertaking is considered every legal entity that carries an economic activity. 
15 C-730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, EU:C:1980:209, para 11; and C- 148/04 Unicredito, 
EU:C:2005:774, para 56. 
16 See Joined Cases T-298/97, T-312/97 etc. Alzetta, judgment of 15 June 2000, paras. 141 to 147; Case 
C-280/00 Altmark Trans, judgment of 24 July 2003. 
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case of a legal monopoly for a particular sector there is no prospect of competition and 
thus, distortion of competition.17 
1.1.4 Effect on inter-state trade 
The last condition in Article 107(1) –effect on interstate trade- is often linked with the 
previous one with both of them being interpreted broadly by the Commission and the 
European Courts. Indeed, the concept of interstate trade presupposes a cross-border 
economic activity involving at least two EU Member States; in the absence of trade 
between EU Member States it is impossible to have an impact on it.18 Therefore, it is 
more likely that effect on trade between EU Member States occurs when the aid 
beneficiary exports its products or services; it sells goods or provides services in other 
EU Member State or to customers from these States.19 However, this does not 
necessarily mean that state aid granted to an undertaking which operates only at local 
level could not affect state between EU Member States. More precisely, even in the 
case where the beneficiary provides only local services, an economic advantage may 
lead to the increase of domestic activity reducing, thus, the chance for undertakings in 
other EU Member State to penetrate the market of the EU Member State concerned.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17 “Slaughter and May - The EU Rules on State Aid.” 
18 Marie Sciskalová and Michael Münster, “Definition and Characteristics of State Aid,” Procedia - Social 
and Behavioral Sciences 110 (January 2014): 223–30, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.865. 
19 See C2000/536/EC – Seleco SpA v Commission 
20 See supra note 17 
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1.2 Derogations from Article 107(1) 
The prohibition set out in Article 107(1) TFEU does not necessarily mean that all state 
aid measures granted by Member States are incompatible with the internal market. 
Despite the general rule, in some circumstances government interventions is necessary 
for a well-functioning and equitable economy.21 Hence, the Treaty “leaves room for a 
number of policy objectives for which State aid can be considered compatible.”22 
Indeed, the Treaty contains some exemptions or derogations from the prohibition, 
which is neither absolute nor unconditional. Article 107(2) TFEU sets out categories of 
aid that are compatible with the Internal market while Article 107(3) provides certain 
categories that may be considered compatible. Contrary to the notion of state aid, the 
exemptions contained in paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 107 TFEU should be 
interpreted narrowly.  
As far as the first group of aid measures is concerned, these are automatically 
considered compatible with the internal market, provided that the preconditions set 
out in the Article 107 (2), for each one of them, are satisfied. More precisely, the first 
category in subparagraph (a) of the Article regards aid having a social character to be 
compatible under the assumption that it benefits final consumers and secures 
indiscrimination related to the origin of the products concerned.23 When it comes to 
the second category, according to Article 107(2) TFEU “aid to make good the damage 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences” can be considered compatible 
with the internal market. It comes as no surprise that the Commission and the Court 
have introduced strict criteria in assessing the term “natural disasters” focusing mainly 
                                               
21 “What Is State Aid? European Commission.” 
22 Ibid 
23 See Article 107(2) The following shall be compatible with the internal market: 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted 
without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the 
division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic 
disadvantages caused by that division. Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision repealing this point. 
 
 -10- 
on the agricultural sector.24 Similarly, the notion “exceptional occurrence” referred to 
the second part of the provision is -in Commission’s view-quite difficult to be 
determined.25 Lastly, the last subparagraph of Article 107(2) TFEU concerns aid 
measures granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany 
affected by the division of Germany after World War II. However, this provision is no 
longer used due to the unification of Germany. 
On the other hand, the types of aid measures laid out in Article 107(3) TFEU are 
discretionary derogations. This is derived from the word “may”, contained in the first 
sentence of Article 107(3) TFEU and Article 108 TFEU. 26The legislation further 
stipulates these exemptions with the laws being regularly reviewed to meet the needs 
for less but better targeted state aid.27 Article 107(3) clearly states that: 
“The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of 
living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and of the 
regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and 
social situation; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest; 
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not 
affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that is 
contrary to the common interest; 
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council 
on a proposal from the Commission.” 
                                               
24 Georgios Kamaris, “A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S STATE AID POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION.,” n.d., 429. Available at http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/8089 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 “What Is State Aid? European Commission.” 
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As a result, the Commission has the authority to apply its discretionary powers in a 
quite broad way while assessing the compatibility of the aid measure with the internal 
market. In so doing, it takes into consideration a series of complex, economic, social, 
regional and sectoral factors, which can be only reviewed be the Court on the grounds 
of their legality. This means that the Court does not have the authority to substitute 
the Commission’s assessments but can only examine that the Commission has not 
erred by a manifest error or by a misuse of powers in its decision.28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Article 263 TFEU 
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1.3 Procedural Rules 
 
The procedural law of the state aid area is regulated by Article 108 TFEU, the Council 
Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 108 TFEU (hereinafter Procedural Regulation) and the 
Community court’s case law. According to these legal texts, the Commission shall in 
close cooperation with Member States control all systems of existing aid schemes. If 
there is a necessity, it shall propose any appropriate measure required for effective 
functioning of the internal market. 
 
The state aid system is based on the ex ante control.29 Article 108 TFEU stipulates the 
obligation for Member States to notify the Commission in advance of any plans to 
grant state aid or to alter existing approved aid schemes unless an exemption applies. 
The obligation to notify is waived for new measures that meet certain requirements 
under applicable regulations and are thus exempt from the notification requirement, 
including the Block Exemption Regulation30, the de minims Regulation31 and the SGEI 
Decision32. 
 
 Notifications must be made by the Member State concerned through the Member 
States’ Permanent Representations in Brussels, as described in the Implementing 
Regulation.33 The purpose of this obligation is to allow the Commission to exercise a 
                                               
29 Piet Jan Slot, “Procedural Aspects of State Aids&#58; The Guardian of Competition Versus the Subsidy 
Villains&#63;,” Common Market Law Review 27, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 741–60. 
30 European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of 
aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty Text with 
EEA relevance (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1). In May 2017 the Commission approved the proposed 
extended scope of GBER to ports and airports through Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084, 
Commission Regulation EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014.  
For more information see Falk Schöning, David Dauchez, and Myrto Tagara, “Key Developments in State 
Aid Law in 2017,” Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9, no. 3 (March 1, 2018): 197–210, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy013. 
31 European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (OJ L 352, 
24.12.2013, p. 1). 
32 European Commission, Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation 
granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
(OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3). 
33 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/2282 (OJ L325/1-180, 10.12.2015) amending Commission Reg. 
794/2004 (OJ 2004 L140, 30.04.2004). 
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preliminary investigation as to whether a planned aid is compatible with the common 
market and can be implemented or whether it should proceed with the formal 
investigation procedure, as it will be discussed in the next chapter. In any case, it is the 
Commission that has the “exclusive authority” to assess the compatibility of state aid 
adopting decisions which are subject to review by the European Court of Justice.34 The 
reason for this is that Article 107(3) TFEU exclusively allows the approval of State aid in 
the public interest and the Commission is the body independent of the Member States 
called upon to be the guardian of the common interests.35 
 
Besides the Commission’s central role, though, the Council has certain powers in 
exceptional circumstances. On application by a Member State, it may, acting 
unanimously, decide that the aid is compatible with the internal market.36 At the 
meantime, if the case has already been initiated by the Commission the application has 
an effect of suspending that procedure, until the Council has made its attitude known. 
If, however, the Council has not given its opinion within three months, the Commission 
can proceed with its decision. 
 
In addition to notification, Article 108(3) TFEU sets out an obligation on the Member 
States not to implement any aid measures until the procedure followed by the 
Commission has resulted in a final decision. The so-called standstill-obligation is 
designed to ensure that aid measures cannot become operational before the 
Commission has had a reasonable period in which to study the proposed measures in 
detail and, if necessary, to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 108(2).37 
Therefore, a Member State infringes on the standstill obligation if it puts a proposed 
measure in effect prior to a final positive decision of the Commission according to 
                                               
34 Case C-248/12 Deutsche Lufthansa AG v.Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn Gmbh ECLI:EU:C:2013:755, para 28 
35 Di Bucci V, “Quelques aspects institutionnels du droit des aides d’Etat”. In: EC State aid law. Le Droit 
des Aides d’Etat dans la CE. Liber Amicorum F. Santaolalla, Wolters Kluwer, The Netherlands (2008), p 
43–64 
36 Article 108 TFEU para.2 
37 Mari Kelve-Liivsoo, Artur Knjazev, and Tea Kookmaa, “Legal Remedies Available to Competitors of 
Recipients of Unlawful State Aid under Estonian Law,” Juridica International 23, no. 0 (November 29, 
2015): 98, https://doi.org/10.12697/JI.2015.23.11. 
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Articles 4(2), 4(3), 9(3)or 9(4) of Regulation 2015/1589.38 Similarly, the misuse of state 
aid by the recipient also constitutes an infringement of the standstill obligation.  
 
State aid granted in breach of the aforementioned procedural obligations of Article 
108 (3) is being regarded as unlawful. It follows, thus, that the unlawful or illegal 
nature of a measure relies exclusively on facts: if the aid was granted without prior 
authorization, it is illegal or unlawful and remains so forever, since these factual 
elements cannot be changed retroactively. In that context, it is important to highlight 
that the unlawfulness of the aid, resulting from the breach of the standstill clause, is 
independent of the compatibility of the aid. In other words, the consequences of the 
unlawfulness cannot be inked to the outcome of the examination of the compatibility 
of the aid. National courts are expected to enforce Article 108(3) TFEU as a directly 
effective provision and draw all the appropriate conclusions of the infringement, even 
when the state aid is finally considered to be compatible with the internal market. 
They can declare an aid measure to be illegal in the absence of proper notification and 
require recovery, whereas the Commission has the power to act so only when the 
formal procedure is finished. The national courts are therefore “the guardians of the 
standstill rule”, as clearly confirmed in the ECJ rulings, with a duty to decide which are 
the appropriate conclusion in every case.39 
 
 Additionally, the compliance with the formal notification requirements set the basis 
for the distinction between the two categories of aid that Regulation 2015/1589 
identifies: the “notified” and “unlawful” state aid. “Notified” aid refers to any new aid 
measure that has followed the requirements of notification and non-implementation 
prior to the Commission taking a position, as foreseen by Article 108 TFEU. On the 
other hand, “non-notified” or “unlawful” refers to any aid measure that has been 
implemented either without prior proper notification to the European Commission or 
that was notified but put into effect before the Commission has reached to its final 
                                               
38 Lucyne Ghazarian, “Recovery Of State Aid,” European State Aid Law Quarterly 15, no. 2 (2016): 228–
34. 
39 Hofmann and Micheau, State Aid Law of the European Union.p.342 
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conclusion on the compatibility with the internal market.40 This distinction has a direct 
impact on the kind of procedure to be followed.41  
 
Another distinction laid out in the Procedural Regulation is between new and existing 
aid. Article 1(c) defines new aid as “all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual 
aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid”. Similarly, the 
definition of existing aid is provided for in Article 1(b) of Regulation 2015/1589 
according to which existing aid is considered to be42: 
1. Aid that existed before the establishment of the EEC or the accession of a 
country to the EEC/EC/EU. 
2. Aid that has been approved or is deemed to have been approved by the 
Commission. 
3. Aid that, because of the state of evolution of the internal market, was not aid 
when it was implemented. 
4. Aid that was granted more than ten years before it came to the attention of the 
Commission [aid for which the limitation period of ten years has expired]. 
What makes this distinction of particular importance is that existing aid escapes the 
scope of the “standstill obligation” and Member States do not need to notify the 
Commission, since the aid scheme is regarded as “authorized aid” under Article 1(b). 
As a result, State aid granted under an existing aid scheme is normally exempted from 
the risk of recovery.43 On the other hand, new aid bears- from the outset- a negative 
presumption on its compatibility with State aid rules with the beneficiary running a 
great risk of having to repay the granted aid.44Having determined the different 
                                               
40 Hofmann and Micheau.p.349 
41 European Commission and Directorate-General for Competition, State Aid Manual of Procedures: 
Internal DG Competition Working Documents on Procedures for the Application of Articles 107 and 108 
TFEU. (Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2013), 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:KD0313301:EN:HTML. 
42 Nicolaides Phedon, “i) New v Existing State Aid ii) Exemption from VAT and Attribution to Member 
States iii) The Duty of National Courts to Protect Competitors from Illegal State aid,” StateAidHub.eu 
(blog), accessed June 15, 2018, http://stateaidhub.eu/blogs/stateaiduncovered/post/4335. 
43Hofmann and Micheau, State Aid Law of the European Union.,p. 351 
44For an extensive analysis on alteration of existing state Aid and new aid see Metaxas Antonis; Spyrou 
Smaragda, Alteration of Existing State Aid and New Aid: On the Criteria of This Legal Categorisation, 
2017 Eur. St. Aid L.Q. 73(2017),“Developments on New and Existing State Aid. Judgment C-590/14, DEI v 
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categories of state aid, the following chapter will further analyze the administrative 
procedure between the Commission and the Member State concerned depending on 
the type of the aid in question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Alouminion Tis Ellados and Commission,” EU State aid blog, accessed July 26, 2018, 
http://eustateaidblog.weebly.com/1/post/2016/11/developments-on-new-and-existing-state-aid-
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CHAPTER II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Ιt has now been established beyond doubt that the Treaty has given the Commission a 
great margin of discretion in the area of competition.45 The aforementioned 
procedural obligations constitute an excellent example of how the Commission retains 
considerable freedom in a series of aspects: as to whether to start a state aid 
investigation, in the way it chooses to conduct the various stages of the investigation, 
in how and when it decides to close it, and under what terms and conditions.46 In 
order to take that decision over the compatibility, the Commission follows a two-step 
procedure whose parties are the Commission itself and the Member States concerned; 
the preliminary assessment and the formal investigation procedure. These two stages 
are the same regardless of the type of the state aid. (notified-non notified). In general, 
the procedure for non-notified aid is the same as for the notified aid with some 
particularities, that will be highlighted below.47 
 
2.1 Procedure regarding notified aid  
After receiving the complete notification from the Member State concerned, the 
Commission shall execute a preliminary investigation of the proposed aid within two 
months and take a decision.48 Should the Commission fail to take such a decision, the 
aid shall be deemed to have been authorized and the Member State will be able to 
implement the measure after notifying the Commission once again. This period can be 
extended if the Commission deems necessary to request for extra information in order 
to reach a prima facie conclusion on the compatibility of the notified aid. The first 
stage can be completed in three different ways.49 Firstly, if the Commission finds out 
that the measure does not constitute a state aid, it shall issue a decision. Secondly, the 
Commission can conclude that there is no doubt over the compatibility with the 
internal market and issue a positive decision. (decision not to raise objections). This 
                                               
45 Hofmann and Micheau, State Aid Law of the European Union. p.341 
46 Ibid 
47 European Commission and Directorate-General for Competition, State Aid Manual of Procedures. 
48 Article 4 of Regulation 2015/1589 
49 Ibid 
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means that in Commission’s view the measure constitutes state aid, which is, however, 
compatible with the internal market. Lastly, the Commission can initiate the formal 
investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2). The last scenario happens in cases 
where the Commission retains doubts as to the compatibility of the measure with the 
internal market. Before going to the analysis of the formal investigation procedure, it 
needs to be mentioned that even in cases where decisions are favorable, the 
Commission has still the power to revoke them as long as these were based on 
imprecise information. (Article 11 of the Regulation). 
 
2.2 Procedure regarding unlawful aid  
As already mentioned, the procedure followed in cases of unlawful aid does not 
present significant differences as to the one described above in cases of notified aid. 
What seems to be different, though, is that in the former the Commission has the 
power to examine any information regarding unlawful aid from any source, with a 
particular focus on competitors.50 The idea behind this is that the unlawful aid has 
already been implemented. Furthermore, the time limits applicable to the duration of 
the initial examination phase for notified aid are way stricter than those applicable for 
unlawful aid51. Most importantly, the Commission has additional means at its disposal 
through the use of injunctions when Member States are not willing to cooperate. In 
particular, there are three different types of potentional injunctions.52 The 
“information injunction” allows the Commission by decision to require information in 
cases where the Member State has not provided the information requested at first 
place or it has provided incomplete information. After the Commission has issued an 
information injunction to the Member State, it is entitled to reach a decision on the 
basis of the information available to it. Another option-though not so common- is for 
the Commission to adopt a decision demanding the Member State to prevent the 
payment of the aid until the Commission has taken its final decision on the 
                                               
50European Commission and Directorate-General for Competition, State Aid Manual of Procedures., 
Section 3.2 
51 Ibid 
52Ana Pošćić, “PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EU STATE AID LAW,” 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.25234/eclic/6542.   
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compatibility of the measure (suspension injunction) in accordance with the 
Procedural Regulation.53 Finally, the last possibility gives the Commission the power to 
provisionally recover any unlawful aid provided that the three requirements laid out in 
Article 13 (2) of the Regulation are met. (there are no doubts about the aid character, 
there is an urgency to act and most importantly risk of the substantial and irreparable 
damage to a competitor).54What needs to be clarified at this point is that since 
unlawfulness refers to procedural issues only (non-notification), it is still possible that 
the measure may be assessed as compatible and the aid therefore be approved.55  
 
2.3 Formal Investigation Procedure  
If the Comission has still doubts about the compatibility of the measure with the 
internal market, it can proceed with the formal investigation procedure, which is an 
extensive investigation. This decision reflects the existence of serious doubts as to the 
combability of the measure with the internal market or procedural difficulties in 
gathering the necessary information. Among the factors indicating serious doubts is 
the duration of the preliminary phase, the number of information requests, meetings 
with the Member State and complaints.56 The aim of these proceedings is to ensure a 
comprehensive examination of the base by exploring any doubtful matters and by 
listening to the views of interested parties. In that context, the decision to open the 
investigation procedure is of particular importance for the Member State concerned, 
potential beneficiaries and their competitors since the opening of the procedure 
enables interested parties to comment.57 The latter have a period of one month to 
submit comments that can be extended for specific reasons.58 At this point, it has to be 
mentioned that according to the Commission’s manual the term “interested parties” 
                                               
53 Ibid, p.498 
54 Injunctions foreseen in Article 13 of Regulation 2015/1589 should not be confused with the interim 
measures that national courts adopt as analyzed in the next chapter. It follows from the binding nature 
of such injunctions that national courts are bound and that, if they are seized by an individual who relies 
on the standstill clause, they are not allowed to take a position different from that of the Commission. 
55 See supra note 50 
56 European Commission and Directorate-General for Competition, State Aid Manual of 
Procedures.section 6-3 
57Hofmann and Micheau, State Aid Law of the European Union., p.371 See Case C-77/12P Deutchse Post 
AG v European Commission. 
58 Article 6 of Regulation 2015/1589 
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includes not only “the firms or firms receiving aid but also firms, individuals or 
associations whose interest might be affected by the grant of the aid-such as 
competitors and trade associations”.59  
 
In general, the case law of the EU courts has proven that interested parties have few 
procedural rights during the administrative phase beyond the right to submit written 
comments.60 For instance, the Court’s approach in Fleuren clearly illustrates the severe 
limitations placed on third party rights. In this case, the Court confirmed its previous 
ruling that “while Article 108(2) requires for the Commission to seek comments from 
interested parties before it takes a decision, it does not, though, prevent the 
Commission from determining aid to be incompatible with the common market in the 
absence of any such comments.”61  
 
The formal investigation procedure is more or less completed in the same way as the 
preliminary investigation. With regards to the notified aid, the Commission has one of 
the following options; the aid measure does not constitute state aid or the aid is 
compatible with the common market and thus can be implemented (positive decision), 
the aid is compatible but subject to stated conditions (conditional decision), the aid is 
incompatible and cannot be implemented, the Member State has withdrawn its 
notification.62 Similarly, as far as the unlawful aid is concerned the Commission might 
find that after the modification by the Member State the measure either does not 
constitute state aid or that it is now compatible. Other possible scenarios are that the 
measure is existing aid or that the aid is compatible but subject to stated conditions. 
The last one concerns the situation where the Commission finds that the aid- though 
granted- is incompatible. In this case the Commission has to order the recovery of the 
aid following the procedure.  
 
                                               
59 See supra note 56, section 6-10 
60 See Case T-231/06 Kingdom of Netherlands and NOS v Commission [2010] ECR II 5993, Case T-109/01 
Fleuren Compost v Commission [2004] ECR II-127 
61 See Case C-113/00 Spain V Commission [2002] ECR i-7601, para 39 
62 European Commission and Directorate-General for Competition, State Aid Manual of Procedures. 
Section 6-14 
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An interesting question arising from the recent EU case law with further implications 
on the national court’s role, as will be examined in the following chapter, is whether 
the Commission’s decision to open the formal investigation procedure is bound for the 
national courts and if so, under which circumstances. According to the case law, the 
preliminary assessment of the Commission in an opening decision as to the State aid 
character of a measure is binding.63 In the recent Lufthansa AG/FFH judgement the ECJ 
held that “the standstill obligation also extends to measures that may constitute state 
aid” meaning that the national court has to assume an infringement once the 
Commission has issued an opening decision.64 In other words, the EJC has concluded 
that once the Commission has adopted a decision about the aid measure in its decision 
to open the formal investigation procedure, the discretion of a national court is limited 
to determining the appropriate measures.65 National courts have to “draw the 
appropriate conclusion from a possible infringement of the last sentence of Article 
108(3)”. Their obligation extends to the to the adoption of all necessary final and 
provision measures, that will be further analyzed in the next chapter.  
 
As follows from the above description, national courts examining the measure in 
question and being aware of the Commission’s decision to open the formal 
investigation procedure do not need to address the issue of whether the measure 
constitutes state aid.66 The Commission has already answered this question by making 
a preliminary assessment and expressing its doubts over the compatibility of the 
measure with the internal market. Despite the provisional nature of this decision, it 
should not be disregarded that it explicitly illustrates the Commission’s doubt about 
the measure. As the ECJ ruled, “national courts must refrain from taking decision 
which conflict with a Commission decision, even if it is provisional”.67Hence, the 
adoption of this decision suffices to regard the aid unlawful or illegal because it should 
not have been enforced until the Commission adopted a final decision authorizing the 
aid.  
                                               
63 Case C-284/12 Lufthansa AGvFFH [2013] ECLi-755,[34] 
 
65 Ghazarian, “Recovery Of State Aid.”p.229 
66 “EU Competition and State Aid Rules - Public and Private Enforcement | Vesna Tomljenović | 
Springer.”, p.230 
67 Deutsche Lufthansa para 44. 
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In this regard, it is also important to note the new mechanism of the Amicus Curiae 
procedure provided to national courts according to Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 
2015/1589 in case of doubts.68 National courts can use it to request information and 
consult the Commission’s opinion on whether the measure at issue constitutes state 
aid or not, or if it is subject to notification obligation.69In general, if the national court 
disagrees, it may diverge from the opening decision, but the principle of sincere 
cooperation, as laid out in Article 4(3) and 12 TFEU, requires the national court to 
request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU in order to determine the validity of the 
decision.70 
 
As national courts are bound by the Commission’s opening decision or at least they 
should take it into account in their reasoning and they cannot adopt a fully 
autonomous opinion on the notion of aid, one could easily argue their role in the 
enforcement of the state aid rules secondary or ancillary. The following chapter will try 
to shed some light on it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
68 See supra note 62, p.230 
69 Jose Luis Buendía Sierra and Miguel Ángel Bolsa Ferruz, “ARTICLES - STATE AID AND NATIONAL 
JURISDICTIONS · State Aid Assessment: What National Courts Can Do and What They Must Do,” 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2017): 408–17, 
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CHAPTER III-ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS IN THE RECOVERY PROCEDURE 
The recovery of aid is the “logical consequence” of the finding that an aid is 
incompatible with the internal market and follows form the use of the word “abolish” 
in Article 108(2).71 Indeed, neither Article 107 nor Article 108 explicitly state that 
incompatible aid has to be recovered from the beneficiaries. The Commission’s power 
to order recovery was established by the ECJ through the landmark Kohlegesetz case in 
1973, when the ECJ stated for the first time that the European Commission may order 
recovery of unlawful and incompatible state aid.72 Some initial jurisprudence referred 
to “illegal aid” rather than “incompatible aid”, meaning that failure to comply with the 
procedural obligations causes the obligation on the Member State to recover.73 
However, case law has made it clear that the Commission does not have the power to 
recover aid in the mere absence of notification.74 Indeed, in the CELF Case the Court 
took the position that Community law does not impose an obligation of full recovery of 
unlawful aid in the event that the Commission subsequently declare the aid in 
question compatible with the common market.75 This does not stop, however, an 
interested party from seeking recovery of “unlawful aid” before the national courts of 
the relevant Member State within the framework of its own domestic law. Should the 
                                               
71 “Legitimate Expectation of Consistent Interpretation of EU State Aid Law: Recovery in State Aid Cases 
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Oxford Academic.”p.424 
72 Case C-70/72 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:1973:87 (Kohlegesetz case) 
73 See supra note 65 
74 Case C-301/87 France v Comission ECLI:EU:C:1990:67 (Boussac Case) 
75 Paul Adriaanse, “Appropriate Measures to Remedy the Consequences of Unlawful State Aid,” SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2009), 
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Commission however decide that no exception under Article 107 TFEU is applicable, 
the State aid is illegal and must be recovered.  
In this case, it is the Member State that bears the responsibility to take all necessary 
measures to recover the aid from the recipient as outlined in Article 14 of the 
Procedural Obligation. The decision shall then be executed without delay and in 
accordance with the procedures under the national law of the Member State 
concerned. The purpose of recovery is to re-establish the situation that existed on the 
market prior to the granting of the unlawful aid and to guarantee the practical effect of 
the standstill obligation.76 This will generally be through the repayment by the 
recipient of all the unlawful aid plus interest at an appropriate rate fixed by the 
Commission. Interest is payable from the date on which the unlawful aid was at the 
disposal of the aid beneficiary until the date of its recovery.77 
The description of the recovery procedure constitutes yet another example of the 
separate and complementary roles that national courts and the Commission fulfil with 
regards to the supervision of Member States’ compliance with their obligations under 
Articles and of the Treaty.78 As already mentioned, Community Courts can review the 
Commission’s decisions while national courts-which have no jurisdiction to access the 
compatibility of a state aid measure-are to ensure that the rights of individuals are 
safeguarded where the obligation to give prior notification of state aid to the 
Commission is violated. The following section will try to shed some light on the role of 
national courts in enforcing unlawful state aid. 
As stated in the previous chapter, while the Commission has the “exclusive authority” 
to rule on the “compatibility or incompatibility” of state aid, it is for the national courts 
to ensure that the rights of individuals are safeguarded where the procedural 
obligations provided in Article 108(3) of the Treaty are infringed. In other words, the 
role of the national court depends on the aid measure at issue and whether that 
                                               
76 Case C-610/10 Commission v Spain [2012] ECLI-781, [103]; Case C-348/93 Commission v Italy [1995] 
ECLI-95, [27] 
77 “Slaughter and May - The EU Rules on State Aid.”, p.11, Procedural Regulation Article 14(2)  
78 Agnieszka Knade-Plaskacz, “The Role of National Courts in Enforcing Unlawful State Aid,” 
Contemporary Legal and Economic Issues; Osijek 4 (2013): 135–44.,p.136 
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measure has been duly notified and approved by the Commission.79 While trying to 
assess the intervention of national courts in the recovery procedure, one could easily 
proceed to a distinction based on a mixed- mainly time but substantial as well-
criterion. More precisely, national courts are often asked to intervene both in cases 
where a Member State has granted aid in breach of either the notification or standstill 
obligation and cases with regards to the enforcement of the recovery decisions in line 
with Article 14 (1) of the Procedural Regulation. The protection of multiple and diverse 
interests, including those of the beneficiaries, the competitors, the “interested parties” 
in general and the Member States, pose a great challenge to the national courts, 
whose role is sometimes narrowly defined. For a better understanding of their role, 
the following analysis will be divided into two different stages: a) the role of national 
courts before the final decision of the Commission and b) the role of national courts 
after the recovery decision. 
3.1 The role of national courts before the final decision of the Commission  
The standstill obligation set out in Article 108(3) of the Treaty gives rise to directly 
effective individual rights of affected parties such as the competitors of the aid 
recipients. Those affected parties, in turn, can claim their rights by bringing legal action 
before competent national courts against the granting Member State.80 Protecting 
individual’s rights arising out of violations of the standstill obligation is one of the 
national courts’ key responsibilities in the state aid field. The rationale behind this is 
that the Commission itself has limited powers to protect competitors and other third 
parties against unlawful aid. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that the 
Commission cannot order the recovery of an aid measure solely because of the 
infringement of the notification obligation.81 On the contrary, it must conduct a full 
compatibility assessment taking into consideration multiple financial, geographical and 
political factors. This gap in the Commission’s powers compounded by the fact that the 
compatibility assessment might be time-consuming has created a challenging situation 
for the competitors and the interested parties in general, whose position seems to be 
                                               
79 Ibid, p.137 
80 Ibid 
81 Case C-301/87 France v Comission ECLI:EU:C:1990:67 (Boussac Case) 
 -26- 
quite vulnerable in community level. As a result, proceedings before national courts 
offer an important means of redress for those affected by unlawful State aid giving 
them the opportunity to resolve state aid related concerns directly at national level.82 
The objection of the national court’s task is therefore to declare measures appropriate 
to remedy the unlawfulness of the implementation of the aid, so that the aid may not 
retain at the free disposal of the recipient while waiting for the Commission’s final 
decision. However, it should be noted that after the opening decision, the discretion of 
a national court is limited to determining the appropriate measures.83 They may decide 
to a) prevent the payment of unlawful aid, b) order the recovery of payments already 
made regardless of compatibility, c) order the recovery of illegality interest or d) order 
interim measures in order to preserve both the interests of the parties concerned and 
the effectiveness of the Commission’s decision to initiate the formal procedure. 
3.1.1 Preventing the payment of unlawful aid  
The EU case law has consistently held that “it is for the national courts to draw all the 
necessary consequences of the infringement of Article 108 (3) TFEU in accordance with 
national law”84. This does not mean that court’s obligations are limited to unlawful aid 
already granted. On the contrary, they also extend to cases where an unlawful 
payment is about to be made. As part of their duties, national courts are required to 
do everything within their powers to give effect to the prohibition laid out in Article 
107(1) TFEU and to the procedural obligations of Article 108(3). Therefore, in cases 
where unlawful aid is about to be implemented, the national court is obliged to 
suspend it. 
 
3.1.2 Recovery of unlawful aid  
As expressed in the SFEI case, “national courts must offer to individuals the certain 
prospect that all the appropriate conclusions will be drawn from an infringement of 
                                               
82 Knade-Plaskacz, “The Role of National Courts in Enforcing Unlawful State Aid.”, p.139 
83 Ghazarian, “Recovery Of State Aid.”, p.228 
84 SFEI and Others, [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 49; Case C-354/90 Fédération Nationale du Commerce 
Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Others v France, [1991] ECR I-5505, paragraph 10; and Case C-
368/04, Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich, [2006] ECR I-9957, paragraph 39. 
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the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty, in accordance with their national 
law.”85 Most importantly, a finding that aid has been granted in breach of Article 
108(3) must in principle lead to its repayment in accordance with the procedural rules 
of domestic law. 86 The word “in principle” should be interpreted in a way meaning 
that there might be exceptional circumstances, which are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, under which the repayment of the aid could be deemed inappropriate.  
Ordering the full recovery of unlawful aid is part of the national court’ s duties to 
safeguard the individual rights of the claimant under Article 108(3) TFEU. In doing so, 
national courts are not required to take into consideration the compatibility of the aid 
measure meaning that they must order the recovery of unlawful aid regardless of its 
compatibility. However, the ECJ with its ruling in the “CELF” Case clarified that the 
national court is not bound to order the full recovery of unlawful aid, where the 
Commission has adopted a final decision declaring that aid be compatible with the 
common market. In the Court’s view, given the purpose of the prohibition laid out in 
Article 108(3) is to guarantee that only compatible aid can be implemented, this can no 
longer be frustrated when the Commission adopts a positive decision.87 While after a 
positive decision, national courts are no longer obliged under Community law to fully 
recover the unlawful aid, the ECJ also made it clear that within the framework of its 
domestic law, national court may, if appropriate, also order the recovery of the 
unlawful aid, without prejudice to the Member State’s right to re-implement it, 
subsequently. 88Once the national court has decided that unlawful aid has been 
disbursed in violation of Article 108(3) of the Treaty, it must quantify the aid in order 
to determine the amount to be recovered. 
 
                                               
85 Case C-39/94, SFEI and Others, [1996] ECR I-3547 para 40 
86 Ibid, para 60 
87Case C-199/06, CELF and Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication v. Societe international de 
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3.1.3 Recovery of interest 
Community law may not require the national court to order full recovery of the 
unlawful but compatible state aid, it requires, however, the national court to “order 
the measures appropriate effectively to remedy the consequences of unlawfulness” 
including the recovery of interest in respect of the period of unlawfulness (hereinafter 
referred to as illegality interest).89 The idea behind this is that the beneficiary acquires 
a financial advantage arising from the early payment of the aid. More precisely, as 
expressed in the CELF case: 
“From the aid recipient’s point of view, the undue advantage will have 
consisted, first, in the non-payment of the interest which it would have paid on 
the amount in question of the compatible aid, had it had to borrow that amount 
on the market pending the Commission’s decision, and, second, in the 
improvement of its competitive position as against the other operators in the 
market while the unlawfulness lasts.90” 
 
Therefore, the undue advantage obtained by the beneficiary needs to be restored 
meaning that the illegality interest needs to be recovered as part of the of the 
national courts’ obligation under Article 108(3) of the Treaty. Most importantly, the 
Court in its ruling also confirmed the national court’s obligation to order recovery 
of illegality interest even after a positive Commission decision. While in 
Commission’s view this might seem quite important for potential claimants,” since 
it also offers a successful remedy in cases where the Commission has already 
declared the aid compatible with the common market”, this paper follows a 
different approach.91 To be more precise, it is beyond doubt that the unlawfulness 
of state aid itself can result in an imbalance among the competing market 
operators. It is highly questionable, though, whether this unbalance could be fully 
restored by solely imposing the obligation to pay the illegality interest on the 
                                               
89Commission, “Commission Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts 2009/C 
85/01,” accessed July 16, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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91 See supra note 91, 
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beneficiary. Considering that the recipient of unlawful aid not only obtains an 
advantage consisting in the non-payment of the interest, as expressed by the ECJ, 
but also could improve his position in the market compared to his competitors by 
reinforcing his brand recognition, one could easily argue that only the payment of 
interest is not sufficient. As for the interest rate to be applied in this context, Article 
9 of the Commission Regulation (EC) 271/2008 lays down detailed rules with 
respect to the method for fixing the recovery interest rate.92  
 
 
3.1.4 Damage claims  
 
Legal protection for third parties under Article 108 (3) is not limited to ordering 
recovery of unlawful aid and illegality interest. The Court has also consistently ruled 
that the national court’s obligation may include awarding damages to competitors 
of the recipient and to other third parties for losses resulting from the unlawful 
aid.93 Such legal actions are usually brought against the state aid granting authority. 
This is because State aid rules, including Article 108(3) TFEU, are addressed to 
Member States and not to private parties, and so it would normally be impossible 
to establish that an aid recipient has committed a breach of EU law which has 
caused loss or damage.94 However, there may be situations in which a cause of 
action based on national law, rather than on a breach of EU law, provides a basis 
for damage claims to be lodged against the aid beneficiary. Similarly, the plaintiff 
will most frequently be a competitor of the beneficiary, but other parties, such as 
the aid beneficiary itself or a third-party creditor, may on occasion suffer loss or 
damage. 
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As the ECJ has confirmed in numerous cases, national law provides legal basis for 
claims for damages based on infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU. Hence, a 
comparative study on the legislative framework governing the enforcement of 
state aid law at national level among the countries of the community can easily 
prove that the legal bases on which claimants have relied in the past are quite 
diverged such as national tort law, national rules on state liability or unfair 
competition.95 
 
Regardless of the existing possibilities under national law, the national court can 
generally order the payment of the compensation by a Member State directly on 
the basis of community law as a result of the directly effectively nature of Article 
108(3). The ECJ identified a direct effect to the standstill obligation in its very early 
case law, when interpreting the former Article 93 TCEE.( 108 TFEU)96 Breaches of 
the standstill obligation can thus, in principle, trigger damage claims in line with the 
Brasserie du Pecheur doctrine. 97 According to this doctrine, Member States are 
required to compensate for loss damage caused to individuals as a result of 
breaches of Community law for which state is responsible if the following 
prerequisites are met. 98 
 
First, the infringed EU law rule must be intended to confer rights on individuals. 
Second, the breach must be sufficiently serious. Third, there must be a direct causal 
link between the breach of the Member State’s obligation and the damage suffered 
by interested parties. The first two conditions are generally easily satisfied since the 
ECJ has repeatedly confirmed that Article 108(3) confers rights on individuals and in 
cases where the authority in question has no discretion in complying with an 
explicit rule, the mere infringement of such rules suffices for there to be a serious 
breach.99 As to the third Brasserie condition, however, it seems that constitutes the 
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main obstacle to a successful damage claim. The reason why this happens is, as 
Goyder and Dons argue, that “the causality requirement involves a two-step 
test”100. In other words, the claimant in state aid damages action must prove firstly 
that there is a causal link between the grant of the aid and the damaging behavior 
and secondly that the damage suffered by the claimant can be attributed to the 
behavior of the beneficiary.101 In this context, it might be difficult to quantify the 
exact loss caused by the aid. The Commission Enforcement Notice in an effort to 
clarify the circumstance under which the requirement of a causal link could be met 
provides certain examples.102 
 
Setting aside the theory, the difficulty of proving the existence of causality is 
elucidated by the Paris Administrative Court Decision in the CELF Case. The Court 
was called to decide on a damages action brought by SIDE against the French State. 
SIDE claimed compensation for harm caused by the award of unlawful aid to its 
main competition, CELF, arguing that those two hold a duopoly on the relevant 
export market for French library works. The grant of the aid placed CELF in an 
advantageous position resulting, thus, in a loss of customers be SIDE. The French 
Curt, however, rejected the claim ruling that the existence of a duopoly does not 
necessarily mean that there is a causal link between the aid and a sale loss for the 
non-beneficiary duopolist.103 Similarly, in the Pantochim judgement, a competitor 
to the aid recipient sued the French State for damages resulting from the 
impossibility of marketing certain products which, unlike the products of the 
beneficiary, had not been subject to a tax exemption.104 The Conseil d’Etat 
concluded that despite the unlawful and incompatible character of the aid with the 
internal market, no causal link existed between the violation and the loss suffered.  
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These two cases are just indicative of the reality in the state aid field and more 
precisely with regards to the state aid damages cases. According to the two studies 
launched by the European Commission on the application of the State aid Rules by 
national courts in 2006 and 2009, there are no cases where competitors or third 
parties were awarded damages in respect of a grant of illegal aid.105 On the other 
hand, antitrust damaging claims have marked significant increase during the last 
years after the intensive efforts of the EU institution and Member States to 
facilitate the position of claimants.106 One could easily argue that this different path 
is attributed to a great extent to the fact that Member States themselves are 
usually the target of state aid damages claims. In this regard, the need for the 
national courts to apply the law in a way that gives the maximum possible clarity to 
both the interested parties and the legal community as to the reasons for the 
success or failure of the claim is of high importance.107 
 
3.1.5 Damages claims against the aid recipient  
In addition to or instead of claiming damages against the state aid granting authority, 
protentional claimants may claim damages directly form the beneficiary. In the “SFEI” 
judgment, the ECJ held that, because Article 108(3) TFEU does not impose a direct 
obligation on the beneficiary, there is no EU law basis for such claims.108 However, this 
does not in any way rule out a damages action against the beneficiary on the basis of 
substantive national law. In most Member States claims for damages against the 
beneficiary rely on national rules governing tort law or unfair competition.109 In order 
for a claim to be based on these provisions, the mere fact that a company accepted 
illegal state aid is usually not enough to drive in a successful result. Additionally, the 
claimant will need to prove that the recipient engaged in unfair competitive conduct or 
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some other type of harmful conduct. A characteristic example of problematic conduct 
by an aid recipient that might result in losses for the competitors is the use of unlawful 
state aid during the tender procedure. The Belgian Commercial Court has ruled that 
such conduct constitutes an act on unfair competition prohibited by the Law on the 
protection of commerce and consumers.110 
3.1.6 Interim measures 
The duty of national courts to draw the necessary legal consequences from violations 
of the standstill obligation is not limited to their final judgments.111 As part of their role 
under Article108(3) of the Treaty, national courts are also obliged to take interim 
measures where this is appropriate to protect the rights of individuals and the 
effectiveness of Article 108(3) TFEU. The ability of national courts to act rapidly -
compared to the Commission- along with the variety of the available measures render 
them quite flexible and appropriate to address emergency situations, where fast relief 
is required. According to the ECJ, this will be the case when it is likely that some time 
will elapse before the national court gives its final judgement on the unlawful grant of 
State aid.112 Under these circumstances, it is for the national court to decide whether it 
is necessary to issue an interim order preventing the illegal disbursement until the final 
decision in order to protect the rights of the interested parties. In case the illegal state 
aid has already been implemented, national courts are usually required to order full 
recovery as part of their guardian duties under Article 108(3). Because of the principle 
of effectiveness, the national court may not postpone this by unduly delaying 
proceedings. It comes as no surprise, tough, that despite this general rule, there might 
be cases where the final judgement is delayed. In light of the above, national courts 
are required to use all available interim measures under the applicable national 
procedural framework to at least terminate the anti-competitive effects of the aid on a 
provisional basis (interim recovery). 
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Interim recovery can also be a very effective instrument in cases where national court 
proceedings run in parallel to a Commission investigation.113 In this way, national 
courts can await the Commission’s final decision over the compatibility of the aid by 
imposing interim measures in the meantime in order to protect individual rights under 
Article 108(3) TFEU. Kreuschitz and Bermejo take the view that from a formal 
perspective this solution seems appropriate, however, from a substantive point of 
view, it raises doubts.114 This is because once the standstill clause has been infringed, 
national courts must react against the breach prioritizing “final remedies” over 
“interim remedies” to address the consequences of unlawfulness.115 
3.2 The role of national courts in the implementation of Comission’s recovery decision  
In addition to the “ex ante” intervention in the recovery procedure, national courts 
also play an important role in the enforcement of recovery decisions adopted under 
Article 14(1) of the Procedural Regulation, where the Commission's assessment 
concludes that aid granted unlawfully is incompatible with the common market and 
enjoins the Member State concerned to recover it from the beneficiary.116 Article 14(3) 
further lays out the conditions for the recovery: it shall be effected “without delay” 
and in “accordance with procedures under the national law of the Member State 
concerned, provided that they allow the immediate and effective execution of the 
Commission’s decision”. The involvement of national courts in such cases usually arises 
from actions brought by beneficiaries trying to challenge the legality of the repayment 
request issued by national authorities.117 However, depending on national procedural 
law, other types of legal action may be possible as well such as actions by Member 
State authorities against the beneficiary aimed at the enforcement of a Commission 
recovery decision or competitors seeking redress against the national authorities’.  
As expressed above, under Article 14 (1) of the Procedural Regulation, when a negative 
decision is adopted in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission “shall” order its recovery 
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by the Member State concerned, which shall take all the measures necessary to this 
purpose. The European Court of Justice has repeatedly interpreted this provision in a 
way that allows Member States to freely choose the means of fulfilling the obligation 
to recover unlawful aid “provided that the measures chosen do not adversely affect 
the scope and effectiveness of European Union law”. 118 Where a national procedural 
rule prevents immediate and/or effective recovery, the national court must leave this 
provision unapplied.119 Therefore, national courts are expected to use all appropriate 
measure and provisions of national law in accordance with the Community law 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence in order to implement the direct effect of 
the Article 108(3) prohibition.120 This includes awarding possible damages to third 
parties whose interests have been harmed. Like violations of the standstill obligation, 
failure by the Member State authorities to comply with a Commission recovery 
decision under Article 14 of the Procedural Regulation can trigger damages claims on 
the basis of state liability for breach of community law. In procedures before national 
courts, interested parties could therefore depend on the last sentence of Article 108 
(3) TFEU, being a directly effective provision of Community law in line with the 
“Francovich” and ‘”Brasserie du Pêcheur” jurisprudence. 121 In the Commission's view, 
the treatment of such damages claims reflects the principles with reference to 
violations of the standstill obligation as described above.122 The idea behind this is that 
(i) the Member State’s recovery obligation is focused on safeguarding the same 
individual rights as the standstill obligation, and (ii) the Commission's recovery 
decisions do not leave national authorities any discretion; breaches of the recovery 
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obligation are thus, in principle, to be considered as adequately serious.123 Hence, the 
success of a damages claim for non-compliance with the Commission’s order for 
recovery will again be assessed on whether the claimant can prove sufficiently that 
that he suffered loss directly as a result of the delayed recovery. 
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Conclusions 
As provided, European State aid law poses an obligation to the EU Member States not 
to grant their companies aid that meets the criteria of the notion of “state aid” which 
unlawfully distorts competition within the European Single Market. As it is a tool 
primarily designed to control the actions of Member States, from the outset the 
European Commission was granted more competencies, including the exclusive 
authority to rule on the compatibility of the aid measure with the internal market.124  
 
In contrast to this question, the analysis of whether and aid measure constitutes state 
aid or not may be assessed by both the European Commission and national courts of 
the Member States. Additionally, as analyzed extensively, Article 108 (3) has a direct 
effect on national legal systems and therefore can be enforced by national courts. This 
creates a situation in which there is one legal regime but two authorities, that is the 
Commission and national courts. And it might be noted that the ECJ has identified that 
they develop complementary but separate roles, however, this is not always so clear. 
 
The analysis of the first two chapters may lead to the conclusion that national courts 
develop a kind of secondary or ancillary role.125 This may however not be the whole 
truth, since this role is only apparently secondary, as it has been further proved in the 
last chapter. On the one hand, in quantitative terms, increasingly litigants are using the 
national courts to challenge member state policies resulting in a remarkably increase 
in the number of state aid cases examined by national courts. 
 
On the other hand, in qualitative terms, despite the preponderant role played by the 
Commission in assessing the compatibility of the aid, national courts develop a 
significant role by deciding the character of the aid measure at issue when the 
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Commission has not adopted yet any decision.126 Additionally, national courts are 
obliged not only to enforce recovery decision of the European Commission under 
Article 108(2) but also ,as meticulously examined in Chapter III, to safeguard the rights 
of individuals violated by an infringement of the standstill obligation of Article 
108(3)TFEU. The latter is of particular interest to the interested parties, who have 
limited rights during the administrative procedure before the Commission and need to 
act swift against an illegally granted aid. 
 
In that context and considering the complex nature of the tasks that national courts 
are called to fulfill, cooperation with the Commission seems absolutely necessary. The 
Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts could be regarded as- 
albeit not the most successful one- an attempt towards this direction introducing two 
mechanisms under which the Commission can assist national courts in their application 
of state aid rules. An interesting question arising nearly 10 years after the adoption of 
this notice is what more needs to be done to ensure an active dialogue between the 
Commission, the Court of Justice and national courts. 
 
 At first place, national courts need to become fully aware of their important role and 
use the mechanisms provided to the them in order to establish a constructive dialogue 
with the Commission and avoid contradictory decisions. In doing so, it is of outmost 
importance for the national judges to understand the European Court’s case law and 
European Commission policy and soft law communications.127 An effective judicial 
training aiming to raise awareness of the tools available among judges and 
practitioners in the Member States should be the starting point for the continuing 
modernizations process of EU state aid law. 		
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